Job Market Paper
Job Market Paper
This study explores how, when income inequality is perceived to arise from both effort and luck, excuses (self-serving belief distortions) can influence acceptance of inequality. In a controlled laboratory setting involving a real-effort task, participants make redistribution decisions between themselves and a partner. The study varied the degree of uncertainty about the role of effort and luck in determining initial earnings endowments. Belief elicitations indicate that increased uncertainty caused participants to be more likely to attribute their partner's success to luck. Furthermore, the use of excuses (attributing others' outcomes to luck) was found to reduce willingness to redistribute earnings to their partners. These findings highlight how excuses about the role of luck versus effort may contribute to the persistence of inequality even if many individuals have meritocratic principles, and how variation in the degree of uncertainty about the causes of inequality, across individuals or societies, may contribute to different degrees of biased beliefs and inequality. The paper also shows evidence of excuses in another sense: According to a structural model of fairness views, individuals tend to adopt a fairness view -- egalitarian, meritocratic, or libertarian -- to justify an allocation that benefits themselves.
Well, Excuse Me! Replicating and Connecting Excuse-Seeking Behaviors (with Yufei Chen, Neeraja Gupta, Kelly Hyde, Marissa Lepper, William Matthews, Neil Silveus, Lise Vesterlund, Taylor Weidman, Alistair Wilson, K.Pun Winichakul, and Liyang Zhou)
Excuse-seeking behavior that facilitates replacing altruistic choices with self-interested ones has been documented in several domains. In a laboratory study, we replicate three leading papers on this topic: Dana et al. (2007), and the use of information avoidance; Exley (2015), and the use of differential risk preferences; and Di Tella et al. (2015), and the use of motivated beliefs. The replications were conducted as part of a graduate course, attempting to embed one answer to the growing call for experimental replications within the pedagogic process. We fully replicate the simpler Dana et al. paper, and broadly replicate the core findings for the other two projects, though with reduced effect sizes and a failure to replicate on some secondary measures. Finally, we attempt to connect behaviors to facilitate the understanding of how each fit within the broader literature. However, we find no connections across domains.
Let me Persuade You First: Sequential Bayesian Persuasion
Draft forthcoming
This paper studies Bayesian persuasion in a collective decision-making setting where a group of politicians votes on the implementation of a project under unanimity rule. Politicians differ in their motivations: some seek re-election and prioritize appearing competent (type A), while others align their preferences with societal welfare (type B). A set of lobbyists, each assigned to a politician, strategically designs information structures to maximize project approval. Using the framework of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), I characterize the equilibrium information structures in both simultaneous and sequential voting environments. I show that lobbyists can exploit the voting dynamics to increase the probability of project implementation, even when the project is suboptimal. In simultaneous voting, persuasion success depends on the composition of politician types, while in sequential voting, an informational cascade among type A politicians amplifies the impact of early votes. I establish conditions under which persuasion is most effective and analyze the implications for information design in policy decisions. The findings highlight the strategic role of information transmission in collective decision-making and its potential to distort socially optimal outcomes.
Moral Sentiments and Contribution to Public Goods (with Margaret McConnell and Stephanie Wang)
We investigate how moral framing and suggested contributions influence individuals' willingness to contribute in a public goods game. Conducted in a laboratory setting, the experiment includes four treatments: (1) participants saw a message suggesting contribution of 70% of their individual valuation, (2) participants saw the message "Do Your Part," (3) participants saw both the suggested contribution and the moral message, and (4) a control group. Results show that both the moral message and suggested contributions increased contributions to the public good, with the highest contributions observed when both were combined. These findings support a model in which individuals are motivated to avoid a negative self-image by aligning with moral or normative suggestions. Our study suggests that prescriptive norms, particularly when combined with moral framing, can effectively increase contributions in public good settings.
"Silly" Interview Questions and Gender Bias in Hiring (with Mallory Avery and Neeraja Gupta)
Data Collection Ongoing
We study how gender gaps in hiring in a male-type environment are influenced by the use of "irrelevant" or "silly" interview questions. These questions, commonly used as ice-breakers, aim to reveal an applicant's personality rather than assess job-related skills. In an online experiment, we collect hiring decisions from "employers" who choose between pairs of "employees" who previously completed a task twice and answered a survey. Employers indicate how much they would pay to see employee's response to the "silly" question; and then, they choose which worker to hire. We manipulate whether employees' gender is revealed.
Preferences over the Timing of Fairness Policies (with Mallory Avery)
Coding and Funding
We explore how the timing of information affects preferences for redistribution. Using an online experiment, we study subjects preferences to redistribute between two workers. We will vary two dimensions: when workers are informed that there will be redistribution later (either before or after they perform a task) and whether the workers learn what their earnings would have been without redistribution. These dimensions mirror differences in real-world redistribution policies. For example, under the U.S. tax system, individuals know before taking a job that taxes will be deducted and also know their pre-tax income. In contrast, salary caps (like in professional sports leagues in the U.S.) prevent people from knowing their potential earnings without the cap, and student loan forgiveness was not anticipated when students initially decided on college enrollment. These policies receive varying levels of public support, and while many factors contribute, the timing of information may be especially important.
Handicaps in Labor Markets
Theory Phase
While initial differences in ability can contribute to income inequality, abilities are not static. They can be improved through experience and practice. However, people might not improve their abilities due to a lack of opportunities or initial disadvantage, increasing the ability gap, reducing mobility, and creating more inequality in the long term. In this paper, I study, theoretically and experimentally, how a handicap tournament (widely used in sports like golf and horse races), in a dynamic setting, affects participation, effort, individual ability, difference in ability among players, and income inequality over both the short and long term. Additionally, I study its impact on economic growth compared to a standard tournament.